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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 In this petition for review of a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), we must determine the 
specificity required in a “notice to appear” (NTA), 
summoning an alien to appear before an Immigration Judge 
(IJ) for removal proceedings.  By statute, an NTA must 
specify “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be 
held.”1  The issue before us is whether a notice that lacks such 
specificity is effective.  The BIA has held that service of an 
NTA, which did not contain these statutory requirements, 
discontinued an alien’s residency period for purposes of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) “stop-time” rule.2  
Milton Orozco-Velasquez contends that BIA’s construction 
of the statute is not entitled to deference and that we should 
grant the petition for review.  
 
I. 
 An alien must reside in the United States “for a 
continuous period of not less than 10 years” to be eligible for 
                                              
1 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). 
2 The INA’s “stop-time” rule “deem[s] to end” an alien’s 
“period of continuous residence . . . when the alien is served a 
notice to appear under” the provision setting out the NTA 
requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 
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cancellation of removal.3  Orozco-Velasquez, a Guatemalan 
native and citizen, arrived in the United States in September 
1998 or February 19994 without being admitted or paroled.5 6  
On May 9, 2008, Orozco-Velasquez was served with a NTA, 
ordering him to appear before an IJ in Elizabeth, New Jersey, 
and noting that the date and time of removal proceedings 
were “to be set.”  Almost two years later, on April 7, 2010, he 
received by mail an otherwise identical NTA, ordering him to 
appear before an IJ in Newark, New Jersey.  The government 
has acknowledged that the second NTA was sent in order to 
correct the address of the Immigration Court before which 
Orozco-Velasquez was summoned to appear.  On April 12, 
2010, he was served with a Notice of Hearing, announcing 
the date and time of the removal proceedings.  
  
 On May 14, 2010, Orozco-Velasquez filed an 
application for cancellation of removal on the ground that his 
removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to his mother, a legal permanent resident of the 
United States.  Thereafter, he moved to terminate removal 
proceedings, arguing that the April 2010 NTA effectively 
                                              
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 
4 Orozco-Velasquez provides the earlier entry date.  The 
Immigration Judge identified the later one, which the BIA 
characterized as “perhaps an incorrect date.” 
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (a)(9)(B)(ii). 
6 The initial NTA was served within ten years of Orozco-
Velasquez’s entry into the United States, assuming either 
arrival date; the corrected NTA came ten years after entry, 
assuming either arrival date.  Thus, the discrepancy in dates 
does not affect Orozco-Velasquez’s eligibility for 
cancellation of removal. 
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superseded the May 2008 NTA and as a result he did not 
receive proper notice of the proceedings until after he had 
resided in the United States for a continuous ten-year period.7  
In an August 19, 2011, oral decision, the IJ denied Orozco-
Velasquez’s motion to terminate and ordered him removed.  
The IJ did not evaluate Orozco-Velasquez’s cancellation of 
removal application on the merits, since he “tend[ed] to agree 
with” the government’s characterization of the April 2010 
NTA as non-superseding.  Thus, the IJ found that notice was 
effective upon service of the April 2010 NTA, precluding 
Orozco-Velasquez’s application for cancellation of removal 
under the INA’s “stop-time” rule, The BIA dismissed the 
ensuing appeal.  Relying on its own precedent, In re 
Camarillo,8 the BIA held that the initial NTA, containing an 
inaccurate Immigration Court address and omitting the date 
and time of Orozco-Velasquez’s removal proceedings, was 
not defective and thus provided adequate notice.  The BIA 
acknowledged that the Camarillo defect—omission of the 
proceedings’ date and time—was “different” than giving the 
wrong address for the court.  Nonetheless, the BIA applied its 
holding in Camarillo to bar Orozco-Velasquez’s application 
for cancellation of removal.  The BIA also cited a Department 
of Justice regulation providing for amendment of an NTA to 
“add[] or substitute[] charges of inadmissibility and/or 
deportability and/or factual allegations”9 in support of its 
determination that “a Notice to Appear is not defective simply 
because the document does not include the specific date, time, 
or place of hearing.” 
                                              
7 At no point did Orozco-Velasquez contest his removability. 
8 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011). 
9 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e). 
6 
 
 Orozco-Velasquez pro se filed a petition for review in 
this Court.  We appointed pro bono amicus curiae counsel10 
and directed amicus curiae and the parties to address in 
supplemental briefs whether (1) Camarillo is entitled to 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,11 and (2) the BIA erred in applying 
Camarillo to bar Orozco-Velasquez’s application for 
cancellation of removal.  We also requested that the parties 
discuss a recent Second Circuit decision, Guamanrrigra v. 
Holder,12 holding that, where an initial NTA contains errors 
and/or omissions that are subsequently corrected, the “stop-
time” rule is triggered only upon perfection of notice. 
 
II. 
 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2).  
The government maintains that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)13 deprives 
us of jurisdiction to consider Orozco-Velasquez’s present 
appeal.  The government relies exclusively on our 
                                              
10 We express our appreciation to counsel Stuart T. Steinberg 
and Ryan M. Moore, of Dechert LLP, who undertook the 
amicus curiae assignment pro bono, and to law student 
Amanda Johnson, who argued adeptly in support of Orozco-
Velasquez. 
11 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
12 670 F.3d 404, 410 (2012) (per curiam). 
13 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), “no court shall have jurisdiction 
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising 
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 
orders against any alien under this chapter.” 
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interpretation of that provision in Calix v. Attorney General.14  
That reliance is misplaced.  Setting aside its nonprecedential 
status,15 Calix does not stand for the proposition that the 
government advances, namely, that an IJ’s denial of a 
petitioner’s motion to terminate proceedings necessarily 
implicates a discretionary enforcement decision by the 
Attorney General and is therefore unreviewable.   
 
 The motion to terminate in Calix was premised on the 
Department of Homeland Security’s purported failure to 
follow its own internal procedures in commencing the 
removal proceedings in the first place.  Thus, the motion to 
terminate served as a not-so-thinly veiled challenge to the 
Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings—a 
plainly discretionary exercise of agency authority.16  To the 
extent that § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar is aimed at “the 
Attorney General’s decision to commence removal 
proceedings,”17 it is inapplicable here.  Orozco-Velasquez’s 
contention is not that the proceedings were improperly 
commenced but that he did not receive proper notice to 
appear at removal proceedings until after the running of the 
                                              
14 423 F. App’x 240 (3d Cir. 2011). 
15 See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5.7; 
Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 278 n.11 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We 
do not accept [nonprecedential] opinions as binding 
precedent[.]”). 
16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or 
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a 
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
discretion.”). 
17 See Calix, 423 F. App’x at 241. 
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stop-time rule and thus he should be eligible to apply for 
cancellation of removal.  For that reason, the provisions of § 
1252(g) do not apply to the present situation.  We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s final 
order dismissing Orozco-Velasquez’s appeal. 
 
III. 
 Where an issue of law implicates the BIA’s expertise, 
we review its legal determinations de novo, subject to the 
Chevron principles of agency deference.18  “Under Chevron, 
the statute’s plain meaning controls, whatever the Board 
might have to say.  But if the law does not speak clearly to the 
question at issue, a court must defer to the Board’s reasonable 
interpretation, rather than substitute its own reading.”19 
 
 The BIA determined that failure to “include the 
specific date, time, or place of hearing” in a NTA has no 
bearing on a notice recipient’s removability.20  Because that 
                                              
18 See Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).  Moreover, where, as here, 
“the BIA issues a written decision on the merits, we review 
its decision and not the decision of the IJ.”  Mahn v. Att’y 
Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). 
19 Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 
(2014) (internal citation omitted). 
20 We assume without deciding that construction of the INA’s 
NTA and “stop-time” provisions implicates the BIA’s 
“expertise in a meaningful way,” Cyberworld Enter. Techs., 
Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2010), so that 
the agency’s determination is reviewed under Chevron’s two-
step inquiry.  Compare INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
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conclusion conflicts with the INA’s plain text, it is not 
entitled to Chevron deference. 
 
 In pertinent part, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) provides as 
follows: 
 
(1) In general 
 
In removal proceedings under section 1229a of 
this title, written notice (in this section referred 
to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in 
person to the alien . . . specifying the following: 
 
(A) The nature of the proceedings 
against the alien. 
 
(B) The legal authority under which the 
proceedings are conducted. 
 
(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in 
violation of law. 
 
(D) The charges against the alien and the 
statutory provisions alleged to have been 
violated. 
                                                                                                     
415, 424-25 (1999) (recognizing BIA’s expertise in defining 
“serious nonpolitical crime,” as used in INA), with Sandoval 
v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1999) (disregarding 
BIA’s claimed expertise in construing INA provision’s 
effective date); Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 
1996) (rejecting BIA’s claimed expertise in interpreting INA 






(G)(i) The time and place at which the 




(2) Notice of change in time or place of 
proceedings 
 
(A) In general 
 
In removal proceedings under section 
1229a of this title, in the case of any 
change or postponement in the time and 
place of such proceedings[] . . . a written 
notice shall be given in person to the 
alien . . . specifying-- 
 
(i) the new time or place of the 
proceedings, and 
 
(ii) the consequences under 
section 1229a(b)(5) of this title of 
failing, except under exceptional 
circumstances, to attend such 
proceedings. 
 
 The INA’s “stop-time” provision, which governs an 
alien’s accrual of continuous residency (ten years of which 
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must be attained to apply for cancellation of removal),21 
specifically incorporates the aforementioned notice 
requirements:  “[A]ny period of continuous residence or 
continuous physical presence in the United States shall be 
deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear 
under section 1229(a) of this title . . ..”22  Thus, an alien’s 
period of continuous residence is interrupted, that is,  time 
stops, only when the government serves a NTA in 
conformance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). 
 
 We disagree with those of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals that have found ambiguity in § 1229b(d)(1)’s “stop-
time” definition.23  To be sure, the “stop-time” statute 
                                              
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 
22 Id. § 1229b(d)(1). 
23 See Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 
2015); Urbina v. Holder, 745 F.3d 736, 739-40 (4th Cir. 
2014); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F.3d 431, 434 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 
2014).  We note that the Urbina court did not engage in its 
own construction of the “stop-time” statute.  Instead, it 
offered:  “As to [Chevron’s] first step, we agree with the BIA 
that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous.”  745 F.3d 
at 740; in speciem contra Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9 
(“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions 
which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”).  To the 
extent that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied in turn 
on the Urbina court’s step one analysis in arriving at the same 
conclusion, 759 F.3d at 674 (citing Urbina, 745 F.3d at 739-
40), it only compounded a misapplication of Chevron’s 
judicially resolved, text-centered threshold inquiry. 
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“encompasses more than just [§ 1229(a)(1)] dealing with the 
NTA.”24  Of particular import, the “stop-time” rule also 
incorporates § 1229(a)(2), which permits a “change or 
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings” if 
the alien is provided written notice of the change.25  But the 
statute’s incorporation of these additional provisions does 
nothing to diminish the clear-cut command set out in § 
1229(a)(1) that notice “shall be given in person to the alien . . 
. specifying,” inter alia, “[t]he time and place at which the 
proceedings will be held.”26 
 
 “The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the language of 
command.”27  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “shall” as “a 
duty to; more broadly, is required to.”  Black’s characterizes 
this most common usage as “the mandatory sense that drafters 
typically intend and that courts typically uphold” statutes 
containing “shall.”28  In the absence of a conflicting canon of 
statutory construction (e.g., statutorily imposed deadlines for 
                                              
24 See Gov’t Supp. Br. at 7. 
25 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A). 
26 Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (emphasis added). 
27 Ala. v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss 
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he 
mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation 
impervious to judicial discretion.”). 
28 Black’s Law Dictionary 1499 (9th ed. 2009); see Eid v. 
Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014) (“When words 
[in statutes] are left undefined, we have turned to standard 
reference works such as legal and general dictionaries in 
order to ascertain their ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
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administrative action),29 we presume that, when Congress 
says shall, it conveys a mandatory rather than a hortatory 
instruction.  We therefore hold that an NTA served “under 
section 1229(a)” is effective, for purposes of the “stop-time” 
rule,30 only when it includes each of the items that Congress 
instructs “shall be given in person to the alien.”31 
 
 Moreover, in requiring that an “alien [be] served a 
notice to appear under section 1229(a)” to suspend the alien’s 
accrual of continuous residency, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) 
simultaneously compels government compliance with each of 
§  1229(a)(1)’s NTA requirements and accommodates a 
“change or postponement in the time and place of [removal] 
proceedings” when the government provides written notice of 
such changes to the alien.  Congress’s incorporation of § 
1229(a) in its entirety conveys a clear intent:  that the 
government may freely amend and generally supplement its 
initial NTA;32 but to cut off an alien’s eligibility for 
cancellation of removal, it must do so within the ten years of 
continuous residence identified in § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (one of 
three cancellation-of-removal provisions the “stop-time” rule 
exists to explicate).  Thus, an initial NTA that fails to satisfy 
§ 1229(a)(1)’s various requirements will not stop the 
                                              
29 See, e.g., Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 193-94 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
30 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 
31 Id. § 1229(a)(1). 
32 Because 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (providing that the 
Government may “add[] or substitute[] charges of 
inadmissibility and/or deportability and/or factual allegations” 
in a NTA) is consistent with our interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1229 and 1229b, we do not address the regulation’s validity. 
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continuous residency clock until the combination of notices, 
properly served on the alien charged as removable, conveys 
the complete set of information prescribed by § 1229(a)(1) 
within the alien’s first ten years of continuous residence.33 
 
 Here, the government did not comply with § 
1229(a)(1)’s directive until April 2010, when it served 
Orozco-Velasquez with a NTA correcting the address of the 
Immigration Court and a Notice of Hearing establishing the 
date and time of removal proceedings.  To the extent that the 
                                              
33 Accord Guamanrrigra, 670 F.3d at 610 (“[W]e hold that 
the stop-time rule is triggered upon service of a Notice to 
Appear that (alone or in combination with a subsequent 
notice) provides the notice required by [§ 1229(a)(1)], 
notwithstanding any imperfections in the service of 
subsequent notices of changes in the time or place of a 
hearing under § [1229(a)(2)].”). 
 In Guaman-Yuqui, the court overruled the 
Guamanrrigra court’s self-styled “hold[ing]” partly on the 
basis of legislative history.  786 F.3d at 238-39.  Notably, the 
only legislative history the court identified was an 
explanatory memorandum that accompanied an omnibus 
appropriations bill amending the “stop-time” rule.  143 Cong. 
Rec. S12265-01 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997).  The memorandum 
submitted by five senators purports to explain why Congress 
enacted the “stop-time” provision in the first place, id. (to 
alter a status quo in which “people were able to accrue time 
toward the [then-]seven-year continuous physical presence 
requirement after they already had been placed in deportation 
proceedings”), but nowhere addresses whether service of a 
defective NTA bears the same “stop-time” consequences as a 
NTA that complies with § 1229(a)(1).   
15 
 
government served the second NTA and Notice of Hearing 
pursuant to § 1229(a)(2),34 it did so too late to affect Orozco-
Velasquez’s eligibility for cancellation of removal.  By the 
time he was served with the latter notices, Orozco-Velasquez 
had resided in the United States continuously for more than 
eleven years.  As the “stop-time” rule does not apply to such 
tardy service, Orozco-Velasquez was entitled to apply for 
cancellation of removal. 
 
IV. 
 A Notice to Appear is not meant to be enigmatic.  Its 
purpose is to provide an alien with notice—of the charges 
against him and the basic contours of the proceedings to 
come.  During the first nine and a half years of his continuous 
residence in the United States, Orozco-Velasquez was given 
no notice at all.  Mere months before the ten-year mark of 
“stop-time” significance, he received an NTA omitting 
fundamental, statutorily required information and 
misinforming him of the proceedings’ location. 
                                              
34 We express no opinion as to whether the NTA and/or 
Notice of Hearing served on Orozco-Velasquez in April 2010 
would be effective outside the context of the “stop-time” rule.  
We are mindful, however, that 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2) provides 
only for a “change or postponement in the time and place of 
[removal] proceedings,” and does not by its terms address 
present circumstances, in which the Government did not 
include a date or time for removal proceedings in the initial 
NTA.  Thus, the April 2010 notice did not provide “the new 
time . . . of the proceedings,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(i) 
(emphasis added), but rather the only time of which Orozco-
Velasquez was ever notified. 
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 The BIA has permitted the government’s counter-
textual mode of providing notice.  Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the agency’s approach might treat even a “notice 
to appear” containing no information whatsoever as a “stop-
time” trigger, permitting the government to fill in the blanks 
(or not) at some unknown time in the future.  We believe such 
an approach contradicts the plain text of the INA’s “stop-
time” and NTA provisions.  Therefore, we will not defer to an 
interpretation of the INA that would omit the requirement that 
full notice be provided to non-citizens facing such critical 
proceedings. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition 
for review, vacate the BIA’s order dismissing the petitioner’s 
appeal, and remand this case to the BIA with instructions to 
remand it to the Immigration Court to consider Orozco-
Velasquez’s application for cancellation of removal.35 
                                              
35 We anticipate that on remand Orozco-Velasquez’s 
application for cancellation of removal will receive the 
“individualized determination” due process demands.  See 
Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2006).  We 
need not decide whether the Immigration Court’s initial 
failure to assess his application on the merits constituted an 
abridgment of procedural due process. 
